CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-SEARCH

AND

SEIZURE-"REASON-

ABLE SUSPICION" TEST PROVIDES CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD
FOR DETAINING SUSPECTED ALIMENTARY CANAL SMUGGLERS-

United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. 3304 (1985).
The 1980's have witnessed a heightened awareness of the
grave problems associated with drug smuggling and drug abuse.'
In response, the Federal Government has developed new, more
stringent methods of law enforcement in an effort to curtail the
flow of illegal substances into this country. 2 Not surprisingly,
drug smugglers have responded to this crackdown by developing
novel, harder-to-detect methods for bringing their wares into the
United States. 3 One new method of smuggling that has become
increasingly popular with drug runners involves a smuggler's
swallowing plastic bags or "balloons" filled with the illegal substances. 4 The smuggler then proceeds into this country with the
undetected contraband concealed safely in his alimentary canal,
to be retrieved later for distribution.5 Sophisticated methods of
drug smuggling, like this one, have tested the permissible limits
of law enforcement methods as Government officials attempt to
uncover new shipments of illegal substances. 6
I See generally Getting Straight, NEWSWEEK, June 4, 1984, at 62, 62-69 (discussing
the huge numbers of Americans struggling to overcome their drug and alcohol addictions); Why U.S. Is Losing the War Against Drugs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 6,

1984, at 49, 49-50 (outlining the country's problem in combating the drug trade)
[hereinafter cited as Losing the War Against Drugs].
2 See generally Losing the War Against Drugs, supra note 1, at 49 ("33 federal agen-

cies in nine departments" currently take part in the war against drugs). In addition,
the President has enlisted the help of the military and the F.B.I. in his campaign
against drugs. Id.
3 See generally United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1349-50 (11 th Cir.)
(discussing traditional methods of smuggling as well as new methods such as alimentary canal smuggling), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 597 (1984).
4 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. 3304, 3309 & n.2 (1985).
5 See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 731 F.2d 1369, 1374 (9th Cir.

1984) (jameson,J., dissenting), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3304 (1985). The alimentary canal
is defined as "[t]he mucous-membrane-lined tube of the digestive system, extending from the mouth to the anus and including the pharynx, esophagus, stomach, and intestines." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 33 (new college ed. 1981). Alimentary canal smugglers initially prepare
their bodies by taking laxatives to flush out their digestive tracts. Hernandez, 731
F.2d at 1374 (Jameson, J., dissenting). Next, the smuggler places the illegal substances in capsules or balloons and swallows them. Id. The smuggler then ingests
certain drugs to slow digestion and curtail diarrhea during their short flight to this
country. Id. Once they safely arrive in this country, they consume a second laxative
to recover the narcotics. Id. (citation omitted).
6 See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 731 F.2d 1369, 1374 (9th Cir.
1984) (Jameson, J., dissenting), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3304 (1985). The Hernandez court
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In United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,7 the United States
Supreme Court examined the legality of customs officials'
searches of persons suspected of smuggling drugs into this country. 8 More specifically, the Court considered the constitutionality
of a twenty-four-hour detention of a person suspected by experienced customs officials of "alimentary canal smuggling." 9
The defendant in Hernandez, Rosa Elvira Montoya de Hernandez, was initially detained by customs officials after she arrived in Los Angeles on Avianca flight 80 from Bogota,
Colombia.' 0 Upon arrival, she passed through immigration without incident and continued to the customs desk where she encountered a customs inspector who reviewed her papers." The
customs inspector noticed from the defendant's documents that
she had traveled to Miami or Los Angeles at least eight times in
the past several months.' 2 Considering this pattern of air travel
suspicious, the inspector instructed her to prepare for further
questioning at a secondary customs desk.' 3
At the second desk, the defendant was asked general questions about herself and the reason for her trip to Los Angeles.' 4
During the course of the questioning, the defendant revealed, in
Spanish, that she did not speak English and had no friends or
relations in the United States.' 5 She further stated that she had
come to the United States with $5000 in cash 1 6 to purchase items
for her husband's business in Bogota. 1 7 She intended to accomplish her purpose by riding around Los Angeles in taxicabs and
visiting retail stores.' 8 As the questioning progressed, the customs inspectors learned from the defendant that she did not have
stated: "It is clear that narcotics smugglers have become increasingly adept at concealing contraband. Consequently, the indicia used by customs officials to identify
smugglers have in some cases become more general and circumstantial." Id.
7 105 S. Ct. 3304 (1985).
8 See id. at 3306.
9 See id.
10 Id.
II ld. at 3306-07.
12 Id. at 3307.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. This money was comprised mostly of $50 bills. Id. While this $5000 represented a substantial sum of money, the defendant did not possess a billfold. Id.
17 Id. The customs officials' suspicions were substantially elevated by the defendant's reference to Bogota because Bogota is a well-known center for narcotics
traffic. Id.
18 Id. The defendant revealed, however, that she had no scheduled meetings
with any merchandise vendor. Id.
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hotel reservations for her stay in America. 9 Furthermore, Hernandez told the inspectors that she could not remember how her
ticket to Los Angeles was purchased.20 When the inspectors proceeded to open the defendant's luggage, they found only "four
changes of 'cold weather' clothing" and noticed that the defendant had no shoes 21except for the single pair of high-heeled shoes
she was wearing.
At this point, the customs officials fully suspected that the
defendant was smuggling drugs into the country. 22 This suspicion was based upon the defendant's past travel practices, the
limited travel provisions contained in her luggage, and her scant
knowledge concerning the particulars of the trip.2 3 One inspector
in particular, who had apprehended dozens of alimentary canal
smugglers on previous Avianca flights,2 4 suspected the defendant
of being a "balloon smuggler."' 2 5 Acting upon this suspicion, the
inspector requested a female customs agent to conduct in private
a pat down and strip search of the defendant. 2 6 During the
course of this search, "the female inspector felt [the defendant's]
abdomen area and noticed a firm fullness, as if [the defendant]
was wearing a girdle."' 27 Although the initial search revealed no
illegal substances, the inspector observed that the defendant had
on two pairs of elastic undergarments lined with paper towels in
the crotch area.28
The female inspector reported her findings to the inspector
in charge, who then informed the defendant that he suspected
her of being a "balloon swallower."' 29 When asked, the defendant
agreed to be X-rayed at a hospital to confirm or rebut these suspicions." Although the defendant informed the inspector that
19 Id.
20 Id. It is frequently the case that internal drug smugglers, or "mules," as they
are referred to, often do not buy their own ticket. See United States v. Renao-Castano, 729 F.2d 1364, 1365 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3552 (1985).
21 Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. at 3307.
22 See id.

23 See supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text.
24 See Hernandez, 105 S.Ct. at 3307. As ofJuly 10, 1982, this inspector had apprehended 25 persons who had arrived on Avianca flight 80 with drugs in their
alimentary canals. United States v. Mendez-Jimenez, 709 F.2d 1300, 1301 (9th Cir.
1983).
25 Hernandez, 105 S.Ct. at 3307. A balloon smuggler is "one who attempts to
smuggle narcotics into this country hidden in [his] alimentary canal." Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.

29 Id.; see also supra note 25 (balloon swallower same as balloon smuggler).
30 Hernandez, 105 S.Ct. at 3307.
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she was pregnant, she agreed to take a pregnancy test for verification before submitting to the X ray. 3 ' The defendant withdrew
her consent to be X-rayed, however, when she was informed that
she would be handcuffed on the way to the hospital. 2 When the
defendant withdrew this consent, she was given her choice of
three options: returning to Bogota on the next flight available,
submitting to an X ray, or remaining in custody until she produced a bowel movement for examination. 3 The defendant initially chose to return to Colombia; however, she was unable to do
so because the next flight to Colombia had a layover in Mexico
and she lacked the necessary visa. 34 The defendant was then adconvised that she would have to remain in custody until she
35
sented to an X ray or had a monitored bowel movement.
The defendant persisted in her refusal to be X-rayed, and
she refused to consume any food or drink.36 She also declined to
use the toilet facilities during her period of confinement.3 7 Instead, the defendant spent most of the following sixteen hours
curled up in a small seat. 38 At that time, customs agents applied

for a magistrate's order permitting a pregnancy test, a rectal examination, and an X ray. 39 This court order was granted approximately eight hours later, making Hernandez's period of
confinement a full twenty-four hours in duration.40 Customs officials then transported the defendant to the hospital where a
pregnancy test was administered; this test later proved to be negative. 4 ' Before these test results were known, however, a doctor
performed a rectal examination of the defendant and extracted a
balloon containing eighty-percent-pure cocaine. 42 The defendant
31
32
33

Id.
Id.
Id.

34 Id. Because the flight from Los Angeles to Bogota would land first in Mexico
City, the Mexican airline refused to place the defendant on the flight without a
Mexican visa. See id.
35 Id. at 3307-08.
36 Id. at 3308.
37 See id.
38 Id. The Supreme Court stated "that [the defendant] exhibited symptoms of
discomfort consistent with 'heroic efforts to resist the usual calls of nature.' " Id.
(quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 731 F.2d 1369, 1371 (9th Cir.
1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3304 (1985)).
39 Id. The order of the Federal magistrate authorizing the rectal examination
and involuntary X ray was conditioned on the physician in charge of the hospital or
emergency room considering the defendant's claim of pregnancy. Id.
40 See id.
41 Id.
42 See id. Within four hours of the initial examination, the defendant passed six
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was then given Miranda warnings 43 and formally placed under
arrest.

44

At the defendant's trial, the district court, after a suppression hearing, decided to admit the cocaine into evidence. 4 5 As a

result, the defendant "was convicted of possession of cocaine
with intent to distribute ' 46 and "unlawful importation of cocaine."' 4 7 On appeal, however, a divided panel of the Ninth Cir-

cuit Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction.48
Although the circuit court recognized that the customs officials
had "a justifiably high level of official skepticism about the" defendant's stated intentions, 49 it held that this skepticism failed to
justify the lengthy detention of the defendant.5 0 The court believed that the inspectors' choice "to let nature take its course"
was no substitute for the immediate procurement of a magistrate's warrant for an X ray. 5 ' The Ninth Circuit noted that
under its prior decisions, a magistrate's warrant would issue
upon a "clear indication" or "plain suggestion" that the suspect
was smuggling drugs in her alimentary canal. 52 Finding that the
inspectors' questioning of Hernandez provided no clear indication of wrongdoing, the court reasoned that "the evidence available to the customs officers when they decided to hold [the
defendant] for continued observation was insufficient to support
the 16-hour detention.

'5 3

It was against this background of con-

flicting district court and Ninth Circuit decisions that the
Supreme Court agreed to resolve the Hernandez controversy.5 4
similar balloons filled with cocaine. See id. Altogether, the defendant "passed 88
balloons containing a total of 528 grams of 80% pure cocaine hydrochloride." Id.
43 See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 731 F.2d 1369, 1371 (9th Cir.
1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3304 (1985).
44 Hernandez, 105 S.Ct. at 3308.
45 Id.
46 Id. (violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982)).
47 Id. (violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(a) (1982)).
48 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 731 F.2d 1369, 1373 (9th Cir. 1984),
rev'd, 105 S.Ct. 3304 (1985).
49 Id. at 1372.
50 Id. at 1373.
51 See Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. at 3308 (citing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 731 F.2d 1369, 1371 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S.Ct. 3304 (1985)).
52 See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 731 F.2d 1369, 1371 (9th Cir.
1984) (citations omitted), rev'd, 105 S.Ct. 3304 (1985).
53 Id. at 1373.
54 See Hernandez, 105 S.Ct. at 3306. The Hernandez Court noted that "another
Circuit Court of Appeals, faced with facts almost identical to this case, has adopted
a less strict standard [than the Ninth Circuit] based upon reasonable suspicion." Id.
at 3310-11 (citing United States v. Mosquera-Ramirez, 729 F.2d 1352, 1355 (11 th

768

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 16:763

The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
protects the people "in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures." 55 Generally, for a
search to be deemed reasonable, it must be authorized by a warrant approved by a magistrate based on a showing of probable
cause.5 6 Courts have long cautioned, however, that the fourth
amendment does not condemn all searches, but only those that
are found to be unreasonable. As a result, probable cause is not
considered a sine qua non for a reasonable search.58 Instead, the
reasonableness of a particular search will depend upon the prior
justification presented to law enforcement officials and the apparent urgency of the need to conduct the search.5 9
An important Supreme Court case dealing with the reasonableness of government searches of individuals is Terry v. Ohio.60
In Terry, the Court faced a situation in which a police officer,
though lacking the traditional probable cause to search, nevertheless had detained and frisked suspects based merely upon a
reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. 6 ' The Terry Court recognized that such brief detentions are governed by the fourth
amendment, but the majority stopped short of holding that all
stops lacking probable cause are per se unconstitutional.62 The
Court declared that the determination of whether such searches
Cir. 1984)). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Hernandez case to settle
this apparent conflict between the circuits. Id. at 3306.
55 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
56 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
57 See id.
at 9; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925).
58 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15-16, 30 (1968) (Court concluding that search
lacking probable cause was nevertheless reasonable and permissible under fourth
amendment).
59 See id. at 20. Outlining the general justification required to conduct a search,
the Terry Court stated:
We do not retreat from our holdings that the police must, whenever
practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures
through the warrant procedure, .

.

. or that in most instances failure to

comply with the warrant requirement can only be excused by exigent
circumstances. .

.

.But we deal here with an entire rubric of police con-

duct-necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat-which historically has not been, and as a
practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure. Instead, the conduct involved in this case must be tested by the Fourth
Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
Id. (citations & footnote omitted).
60 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
61 See id.
at 5-8.
(2 See id.
at 20.
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are reasonable requires a two-step analysis: first, a tribunal must
determine if the action taken by the officer was permissible at its
inception, and second, the court must decide whether the search
was "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."6 3
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren determined
that in order to assess the reasonableness of a search, a court
must balance the officer's need to conduct the search against the
accompanying intrusion on the suspect's liberty.' Chief Justice
Warren further stated that to prove a legitimate need to search,
the officer involved "must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."6 5 Hence, the Terry
Court recognized the validity of searches based upon observations that would "'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief, that the action taken was appropriate. "66
Furthermore, searches at the nation's border have long been
subject to different constitutional standards than searches conducted in the nation's interior. 67 The Supreme Court and Congress have consistently recognized that searches conducted at the
national border are presumed to be reasonable because of the
long-standing right of a sovereign to protect its boundaries.6 " In
the 1925 case of Carroll v. United States, 69 the Supreme Court expressly approved the Government's practice of searching every
vehicle entering the United States, regardless of whether probable cause to conduct a search existed. 70 The Carroll Court noted
that while such a practice would be unreasonable if conducted in
the nation's interior, the nation's interest in self-protection justified a search of every vehicle at the border. 7' Hence, the Court
recognized the broad powers to search that border officials have
63 Id. at 19-20.
64 Id. at 20-21.

65 Id. at 21 (footnote omitted).
66 Id. at 22 (citations omitted).
67 See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-19 (1977); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925).
68 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925). The Carroll Court
stated that "[t]ravellers may be... stopped [without probable cause] in crossing
an international boundary because of national self protection reasonably requiring
one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in." Id.; see also infra notes 89-102 and
accompanying text (discussing recent border search cases).
69 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
70 See id. at 154.
71 See id.
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enjoyed ever since the Carroll decision. 2
Fourth amendment jurisprudence was taken a step further in
the 1950's and 1960's in a series of cases examining the government's right to procure evidence contained within a suspect's
body. In its 1952 decision in Rochin v. California,7 3 the Supreme
Court found unreasonable a stomach pump search of a defendant who had swallowed two capsules during a drug raid.7 ' The
Rochin majority reasoned that the police conduct in this instance
was so egregious that it "shock[ed] the conscience" of the
Court. 75 Therefore, the Court invalidated the search as an unreasonable violation of the defendant's due process rights. 6
Fourteen years after its decision in Rochin, however, the
Supreme Court expressly approved the taking of a blood sample

from a defendant suspected of drunken driving.7 7 In Schmerber v.
California,8 the Court held not only that the procurement of a
blood sample is a reasonable search under the fourth amendment, but also that it does not violate the suspect's fifth amend-

ment privilege against self-incrimination. 79 The Court reasoned
that when considered as a search, this taking of blood from the
suspect was reasonable because the procedure was performed-by
a doctor and because there was a danger that the evidence-a

high blood-alcohol concentration-would be destroyed if immediate action were not taken.8 ° Unlike the situation in Rochin, the

police officers in Schmerber used no abusive, "conscience-shock72 See id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress broad powers to
regulate commerce with foreign nations).
73 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
74 Id. at 166, 174.
75 Id. at 172. The Rochin Court stated:
Applying these general considerations to the circumstances of the
present case, we are compelled to conclude that the proceedings by
which this conviction was obtained do more than offend some fastidious
squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too
energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally
breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his
mouth and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's contents-this course of proceeding by agents of government to
obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They
are methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation.
Id.
76 Id. at 174.
77 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
78 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
71) See id. at 760, 761, 772.
80 See id. at 770-72.
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ing" means to obtain evidence. 8 '
The Schmerber Court then took an interesting approach to the
defendant's claim of a fifth amendment violation. Recognizing
that the fifth amendment protects a suspect from being compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,8" the
Court opined that this protection only extends to "evidence of a
testimonial or communicative nature." 83 The Court noted that
many state and Federal cases have held that the fifth amendment
does not protect a criminal suspect from submitting to such techniques as fingerprinting, photographing, measurements, writing
analysis, and voice identification.84 The reason for this, the
Schmerber Court stated, is that these items constitute noncommunicative evidence, which cannot be subverted by abusive law
enforcement practices.85 The taking of a blood sample was considered similar to these procedures because it fails to implicate
the suspect's testimonial capacity.86 The Court noted that the results of the test depended solely upon the chemical analysis of
the evidence withdrawn and that the suspect, other than being
the donor of the blood, had little to do with the procedure.87
Hence, the Court admitted the evidence as consistent with the
88
protections of the fifth amendment.
Subsequently, in the 1970's, the Supreme Court re-examined the constitutionality of government searches at the
United States border in a series of immigration control cases.
Three decisions in particular-Almeida-Sanchezv. United States, 89
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,9 ° and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte9" -established the constitutionally permissible procedures
for detaining and searching vehicles at the border. In AlmeidaSanchez, the Court held that a warrantless police search of an automobile conducted only twenty miles from the Mexican border
81 See id. at 760.
82 Id. at 761.
83 Id. The Schmerber Court recognized that "the withdrawal of blood and use of
the analysis in question in this case' did not involve compulsion to these ends." Id.
84

Id. at 764.

See id. at 764-65. The Schmerber Court noted that the "compulsion which
makes a suspect or accused the source of 'real or physical evidence' does not violate
[the privilege against self-incrimination.]" Id.
86 Id. at 765.
87 See id.
88 Id.
89 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
90 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
91 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
85
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was a violation of the fourth amendment. 92 Although the Court
recognized that the search was predicated on police efforts to detect illegal aliens, it reasoned that it could not condone arbitrary
police stops of automobiles simply because the stops were conducted near the national border.9 3 The Court stated that some
prior justification to search must exist before it would approve
warrantless vehicle stops in the nation's interior.9 4 The Court did
reaffirm, however, that Carrolland subsequent decisions had provided for broad governmental powers to conduct searches at the
nation's border.9 5
In Brignoni-Ponce, decided two years after Almeida-Sanchez, the
Supreme Court once again held a random stop of an automobile
near the national border unconstitutional.9 6 In that case, police
officers had stopped a vehicle to search for illegal aliens merely
because the occupants of the automobile appeared to be of Mexican ancestry.9 7 The Court found that this observation by police,
without something more, could not serve to justify a roving patrol search as reasonable under the fourth amendment. 9 8
One year later, however, in Martinez-Fuerte, the Supreme
Court expressly approved a police-conducted, illegal-alien checkpoint that was set up near the national border.9 9 The MartinezFuerte Court reasoned that fixed checkpoints near the national
border, at which all vehicles are stopped, present a lesser degree
of objective intrusion than the random stops conducted in Almeida-Sanchez and Brignoni-Ponce.10 0 The Court further opined that
because these fixed checkpoints are monitored by higher-level
government officials, they are not the product of the unbridled
discretion of officers in the field.' 0 ' Thus, the Court held that
92 Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 273. The officers who conducted this arbitrary
stop were simply engaged in a roving border patrol as opposed to a fixed border
checkpoint. Id.
93 See id.
94 See id. at 269-70.
95 See id. at 272.
96 See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 887.
97 Id. at 875.
98 See id. at 884. The Brignoni-PonceCourt stated that "[e]xcept at the border and
its functional equivalents, officers on roving patrol may stop vehicles only if they
are aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those
facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be
illegally in the country." Id. (footnote omitted).
99 See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 566.

100 See id. at 559.

I

See id. The Martinez-Fuerte Court posited that because
field officers may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is
less room for abusive or harassing stops of individuals than there was in
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fixed-checkpoint stops are reasonable
methods of law enforce10 2
ment under the fourth amendment.

These immigration control cases, along with the earlier cases
dealing with border searches and interior body searches, have
subsequently served as the legal authority for circuit courts
presented with the issue of governmental searches of alimentary
canal smugglers. Not surprisingly, the circuit courts have
reached varied conclusions regarding the constitutionality of
these searches. 0 3 While the Fifth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit have appeared willing to condone the actions of customs officials, 0 4 the Ninth Circuit has experienced great difficulty in
deciding how far customs inspectors may go when detaining and
0 5
searching persons suspected of alimentary canal smuggling.
Borrowing language from the Supreme Court's holding in
Schmerber, the Ninth Circuit has determined that customs officials
need a "clear indication" of alimentary canal smuggling before
they can constitutionally detain a suspect. 0 6 The Ninth Circuit
therefore has adopted an intermediate standard for searching
smuggling suspects, which falls somewhere between "reasonable
suspicion" and "probable cause."' 7
the case of roving-patrol stops. Moreover, a claim that a particular exercise of discretion in locating or operating a checkpoint is unreasonable
is subject to post-stop judicial review.
Id. (footnote omitted).
102 Id. at 566-67.
103 See infra notes 104-115 and accompanying text.
104 See, e.g., United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 597 (1984); United States v. Mejia, 720 F.2d 1378 (5th Cir. 1983) (both
upholding the constitutionality of customs officials' detentions of persons suspected of alimentary canal smuggling). The Vega-Barvo court adopted a "reasonable suspicion" standard for determining the constitutionality of searching people
suspected of alimentary canal smuggling. See Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d at 1349. The
Eleventh Circuit stated that the standard was usually met in cases where the suspect
was first approached because he fit into a drug courier profile that had been formulated by customs officials. Id. The court noted, however, that the factors which
comprise the profile would be scrutinized in order to determine whether there was
a "reasonable suspicion." See id.
In Mejia, the Fifth Circuit noted that while using a drug courier profile may by
itself be insufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion to search, it may warrant the
further examination of suspects. See Mejia, 720 F.2d at 1382. The court stated that
the profile, coupled with the information procured during the examination, may be
enough to meet the standard. See id.
105 See infra notes 106-115 and accompanying text.
106 See United States v. Mendez-Jimenez, 709 F.2d 1300, 1302 (9th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Quintero-Castro, 705 F.2d 1099, 1100 (9th Cir. 1983). The
Supreme Court recognized in the Hernandez decision that the "clear indication" language was first set forth in Schmerber. See Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. at 3310.
107 See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 731 F.2d 1369, 1371-72 (9th Cir.
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Unfortunately, application of this standard has led to disparate results.' 0 8 In two important 1983 decisions, United States v.
Quintero-Castro109 and United States v. Mendez-Jimenez, " 0 the Ninth
Circuit reached opposite conclusions regarding the constitutionality of the detention of a person suspected of alimentary canal
smuggling."' The former case invalidated a warrant permitting
an X-ray search of a suspect because customs officials failed to
supply the issuing magistrate with a "clear indication" that the
suspect might be smuggling contraband." 2 The latter case,
although based on many similar facts, approved an X-ray search
of a suspected smuggler for exactly the opposite reason. 113
One year later, in United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,' 4 the
Ninth Circuit again invalidated a customs search because the ob1984) (explaining the reasons for this intermediate standard applied by Ninth Circuit courts), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3304 (1985).
108 See infra notes 109-116 and accompanying text.
109 705 F.2d 1099 (9th Cir. 1983).
11o 709 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1983).
111 Compare Quintero-Castro, 705 F.2d at 1101 (holding facts did not support issuance of warrant to conduct X-ray search of alimentary canal smuggling suspect) with
Mendez-Jimenez, 709 F.2d at 1304 (holding facts did support issuance of warrant to
conduct X-ray search of suspected smuggler).
112 See Quintero-Castro, 705 F.2d at 1100-01. The Quintero-Castro court noted:
The facts as recited in the affidavit showed that Quintero-Castro
appeared nervous; he had paid cash for his airline ticket; he said that he
was on a short pleasure trip without his family; and that although he had
relatives in the area, he planned to stay at a hotel. Aguilar and Quintero-Castro gave conflicting answers on whether they knew each other
even though they were traveling together. They were coming from a
drug source country. Quintero-Castro had a large amount of cash and
told conflicting stories about his occupation. These are suspicious circumstances and indicate some wrongdoing, but the issue here is
whether these circumstances adequately focused suspicion on body cavity smuggling.
Id. (citation omitted). The court concluded that these factors failed to support a
search of the suspect. Id. at 1101.
113 See Mendez-Jimenez, 709 F.2d at 1304. Although the defendant in Quintero-Castro was also carrying a large amount of cash, was very nervous, and was unable to
explain accurately the purpose of his trip, the Mendez-Jimenez court distinguished
this case from Quintero-Castroby noting that
[i]n [Quintero-Castro], there were fewer factors to support a finding of
clear indication. There was no anti-diarrhea pill or any other substance
which would be associated with internal smuggling; there was no showing of non-consumption of food or beverages; the suspects had relatives
in the United States; and there was no evidence of passport tampering.
That case is therefore clearly distinguishable from this one.
Id. Hence, the Ninth Circuit made it clear that the question of whether a suspect
could constitutionally be searched on a suspicion of alimentary canal smuggling
was extremely fact sensitive. See id.
114 731 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3304 (1985).
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servations upon which officials based their search failed to pro5
vide a "clear indication" that the suspect was smuggling.' 1
Finally, the Supreme Court, eager to eliminate the conflict
among the circuits, granted certiorari in the Hernandez case in order to clarify the constitutional standards for detaining and
16
searching someone suspected of alimentary canal smuggling.'
In Hernandez, the Supreme Court adopted the "reasonable
suspicion" standard for evaluating the legality of a customs official's acts when detaining an international traveler for more than
a routine customs inspection and search." 7 Under this standard,
customs officials at the national border need "a 'particularized
and objective basis for suspecting the particular person' of alimentary canal smuggling." ' 1 8 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, 1 19 postulated that this standard allows for a balancing
of the private and public interests involved in alimentary canal
searches while recognizing the detection problems inherent in
20
this type of smuggling.
The Hernandez Court began its analysis by acknowledging the
long-standing principle that border searches answer to different
constitutional standards than searches that occur in the nation's
interior.' 2 ' The Court disagreed, however, with the Ninth Cir115 See id. at 1373; see also supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text (discussing
Ninth Circuit's reasoning).
116 See Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. at 3306.
117 Id. at 3311. This standard was first enunciated by the Court in Terry v. Ohio.
See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text (discussing Terry).
118 Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. at 3311 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,
417 (1981)) (additional citations omitted).
119 Id. at 3306. Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion. See id. at 3313 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice
Marshall joined. See id. at 3313-25 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
120 Id. at 3311. Justice Rehnquist noted that alimentary canal smuggling usually
"gives no external signs" that it is occurring. Id. Thus, customs officials will rarely
have probable cause to search or arrest despite the important governmental interest in preventing smuggling. Id.
121 Id. at 3309. Justice Rehnquist based this contention on the long line of cases
holding that border searches involve different considerations and constitutional
principles than searches occurring inside the country. See id. One of these special
considerations is the important governmental interest in preventing contraband
from entering the country. See id. Justice Rehnquist recognized that customs officials are empowered to prevent persons from bringing anything harmful-such as
narcotics, explosives, or communicable diseases-into the country. Id. at 3312 (citations omitted). He analogized the detention of a suspected alimentary canal
smuggler at the border to that of a suspected tuberculosis carrier; both should be
detained until their bodies dispel the inspector's suspicion that they will bring
something harmful into the country. Id. Justice Rehnquist also noted that the
Court had previously approved the stopping of motorists at fixed border checkpoints without individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. Id. at 3309 (citing United
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cuit's determination that a "clear indication" standard should
govern the constitutionality of searches at the United States border. 122 Justice Rehnquist stated that the circuit court had misapplied the principles enunciated in Schmerber by applying the "clear
indication" standard to the Hernandez case. 123 The Court noted
that "[n]o other court, including this one, has ever adopted
Schmerber's 'clear indication' language as a Fourth Amendment
standard." 124 Justice Rehnquist opined that the Schmerber Court's
"clear indication" language simply explained the level of particularized suspicion necessary to show that evidence sought might
actually be within a person's body. 12 5 Justice Rehnquist stated
that this language did not create a third fourth-amendment standard lying somewhere
between "reasonable suspicion" and
"probable cause.' 1 26 Hence, the Court opted to apply the "reasonable suspicion" test in the Hernandez case because this standard had been applied in a number of other fourth amendment
27
contexts. 1

Justice Rehnquist next posited that the "reasonable suspicion" standard is particularly well-suited for use in alimentary canal smuggling cases.' 12 He based this determination on the fact
that this specific type of smuggling rarely provides customs officials with any external signs of its existence. 129 Thus, customs officials generally will not have probable cause to arrest and search
these smugglers, despite the enormous governmental interest in
stopping international drug trafficking.' 0 The Court stressed
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562-63 (1976)). All of these considerations,Justice Rehnquist reasoned, supported the detention of Hernandez. See id. at
3312.
122 Id. at 3310.
123 Id. In Schmerber, the Court stated:
The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions [beyond the body's surface] on
the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these
fundamental human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that
such evidence may disappear unless there is an immediate search.
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769 (emphasis added).
124 Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. at 3310 (citation omitted).
125 Id.
126 Id. Justice Rehnquist noted that "subtle verbal graduations" of the required
suspicion under the fourth amendment may obscure rather than clarify the amendment's meaning. Id. at 3311.
127 See id.
128 Id.
129
130

Id.
Id.
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that the customs inspectors in Hernandez were trained officers
who had encountered numerous alimentary canal smugglers in
the course of their employment; therefore, they clearly had more
than an " 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch" "
that this defendant was an alimentary canal smuggler. 13 ' Rather,
Justice Rehnquist opined that the customs officials' "suspicions
[were] a 'common sense conclusio[n] about human behavior'
people,' including government officials, are
upon which 'practical
' 32
entitled to rely."'
After adopting the "reasonable suspicion" standard as the
requisite basis for the detention of Hernandez, the Court addressed the issue of whether this particular detention was reasonable in scope. 13 3 The Court first pointed to the recently decided
case of United States v. Sharpe,134 in which the Supreme Court held
that courts should not engage in " 'unrealistic second guessing' "
when evaluating the reasonableness of a search.1 35 Justice Rehnquist noted that an after-the-fact evaluation of police conduct can
almost always result in a judge's formulation of some less intrusive, alternative procedure for accomplishing police objectives. 136 The Court stated that an abstract finding that the public
might have been afforded greater protection if the police had
used less intrusive means does not immediately render the search
unreasonable. 13' Rather, the Court believed that law enforcement officials should "be allowed 'to graduate their response to
the demands of any particular situation.' "138
The Court also considered whether the length of time that
the customs officials had detained the defendant rendered this

particular stop constitutionally unreasonable.

39

The Court first

recognized that this detention exceeded the time limit that the

Supreme Court had approved in other reasonable suspicion
cases.' 40 Justice Rehnquist cautioned, however, that the Court
had consistently rejected "hard-and-fast time limits" in favor of a
common-sense approach based on ordinary human experiId. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
134 105 S. Ct. 1568 (1985).
135 Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. at 3311 (quoting Sharpe, 105 S.Ct. at 1576).
131
132
133

136

Id.

137 Id. (citing Sharpe, 105 S.Ct. at 1576).
138
139

140

Id. (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 n.10 (1983)).
Id. at 3312.

Id.
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ence.14 1 Furthermore, the Court noted that in this situation, the
defendant precipitated much of the discomfort and duration of
her confinement because of the method she selected for smuggling drugs into the country. 14 2 Justice Rehnquist also pointed
out that the Court has refused to censure police delays in investigative detentions when such a delay is attributable to the evasive

actions of the suspect. 143
Continuing his analysis, Justice Rehnquist noted the unique
difficulty faced by customs officials when someone reasonably
suspected of alimentary canal smuggling refuses to submit to an
X ray in order to rebut this suspicion. 14 4 The Court stated that
customs officials faced with this situation would have only two
alternatives. 145 They could either detain the suspect for such time
as is necessary to confirm or dispel their suspicions-a time period almost certain, because of the intricacies of human biology,
to be longer than a traditional Terry search-or they could turn
the suspect loose to carry the suspected contraband into the
country. 1 46 The Court pointed out, however, that releasing the
suspect was not constitutionally mandated. 147 Justice Rehnquist
observed that the fourth amendment has never required a law
enforcement officer who has a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, but who lacks probable cause, " 'to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape.' "814
Rather, the Court reasoned that the officers are entitled to take
1 49
reasonable steps to confirm or deny their suspicions.
The Court therefore concluded that the customs officials,
based upon their reasonable, articulable suspicions that Hernandez was guilty of alimentary canal smuggling, were not required to allow the defendant to carry her cache of cocaine into
141

Id. (citations omitted).

142

Id.

143

Id.

144

See id.The Court stated that the
rudimentary knowledge of the human body [that we all possess] tells us
that alimentary canal smuggling cannot be detected in the amount of
time in which other illegal activity may be investigated through brief
Terry-type stops. It presents few, if any external signs; a quick frisk will
not do, nor will even a strip search.

Id.
145
146

Id.

Id.

147 See id.at 3312-13.
148

Id. at 3312 (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145 (1972)).

149 See id.at 3313.
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the country. 5 ' Instead, the Court held that it was reasonable for
customs officials to detain the defendant for a time period sufficient either to verify or to dispel the reasonable suspicions they
had already formulated.' 5
Justice Stevens concurred with the majority's holding.'52 He
did not agree, however, that the long and degrading detention of
the defendant was justified by the defendant's choice of smuggling methods. 5 Rather, Justice Stevens believed that the detention was warranted because the defendant withdrew her
consent to have an X ray taken. 15 4 Justice Stevens reasoned that

an X ray of the defendant would have determined whether the
suspicion that she was carrying drugs was reasonable.' 5 5 Thus,
Justice Stevens took the majority's opinion one step further and
stated that he would allow customs officials to require a nonpregnant person reasonably suspected of being an alimentary canal smuggler to submit to an X-ray examination as part of a
156
border search.

Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented. 157
Justice Brennan agreed with the majority that the fourth amendment permits law enforcement officials to subject travelers at the
United States border to routine questioning, preliminary frisks,
and thorough examinations of their belongings. 158 These procedures are all permissible, Justice Brennan opined, because of the
nation's need to protect itself. 159 Justice Brennan stated, however, that Federal officials could confine someone at the border
for a criminal investigation only under those circumstances that
would allow a similar confinement in the nation's interior. 160
Therefore, Justice Brennan believed that when border investigations extend beyond these preliminary searches, they are presumed reasonable only if they are authorized by a magistrate
upon a demonstration of probable cause. 16 1 Justice Brennan
150

Id. at 3312-13.

151 Id. at 3313.
152

Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).

153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156

Id.

157 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).

158 Id. at 3316 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
159 Id. (citing Carroll, 267 U.S. at 154).
160 See id.
161 See id. The fourth amendment states that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
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stated that the confinement of Hernandez for twenty-four hours
based solely on the suspicions of customs officials was not only
constitutionally unreasonable, but was also an affront to the defendant's human dignity and an abuse of power by the Government officials.' 6 2 Hence, he declared that6 3 the detention of
Hernandez violated the fourth amendment.
Justice Brennan added that he did not believe these unconstitutional tactics are the only methods available to customs incanal
smugglers.'64
alimentary
spectors
for detecting
Concluding his dissent, he suggested that the Government could
have maintained its interest in acting expediently, while still preserving the suspect's fourth amendment rights, "by obtaining a
telephonic search warrant-a procedure 'ideally suited to the peculiar needs of the customs authorities.' "165
The majority's decision in Hernandez reflects, more than anything else, the increasing concern that drug trafficking is a growing and virtually irreversible trend in our society. 1 66 Every day,
drug abuse destroys the life of another American and forces
place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend.
IV. With regard to this language, Justice Brennan stated:
[T]he Court repeatedly has emphasized that the Fourth Amendment's
Warrant Clause is not mere "dead language" or a bothersome "inconvenience to be somehow 'weighed' against the claims of police efficiency. It is, or should be, an important working part of our machinery
of government, operating as a matter of course to check the 'well-intentioned but mistakenly overzealous executive officers' who are a part of
any system of law enforcement."
Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. at 3317 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v.
United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315-16 (1972)). Justice Brennan reasoned
that the "Warrant Clause" is so fundamental that it requires a magistrate's authorization before government officials may perform such "administrative searches" as
"fire, health, and housing-code inspections." Id. at 3318 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan believed that "[s]omething has gone fundamentally awry in our
constitutional jurisprudence when a" warrant is necessary to conduct an "administrative search," but not to hold a person "in indefinite involuntary isolation at the
nation's border to investigate whether he might be engaged in criminal wrongdoing." Id. at 3318-19 (Brennan,J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that the determination to search should not be made ex parte by customs officials because their
unbridled " 'discretion may yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating
evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy.' " Id. at 3319 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317
(1972)).
162 See Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. at 3319 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
163 Id. at 3324 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
164 See id. at 3319-20 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
165 Id. (footnote omitted). Procurement of a warrant by telephone was finally effected by customs officials 24 hours after the defendant's initial detention. Id. at
3320 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
166 See id. at 3309. Justice Rehnquist recognized that cases such as Hernandez evi-
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countless others to turn to crime to support their habits. 167 In a
society that prides itself on being one of the most advanced and
productive in the world, the social costs of drug abuse are disturbing.168 Desperate for a solution to the problem, the President
of the United States and the United States Government have enlisted the military to combat drug trafficking with sophisticated
69
tracking equipment used to detect smuggling in progress.
While these efforts have enjoyed some success, the problem of
substance abuse is still devastating. 17 1 Clearly, the Hernandez
Court was correct in determining that the Federal Government's
interest in stemming
the international drug trade is
7
overwhelming. '

Nevertheless, even an important governmental interest in
stemming crime must be balanced against an individual's fourth
amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. 72 If the fourth amendment is to have any significance in
modern constitutional jurisprudence, then law enforcement officers should not be allowed to detain and search people based
upon abstract suspicions or "hunches."'1 73 Although it is tempting to justify a search by what it uncovers, this reasoning cannot
be accepted because it gives absolutely no effect to the constitutional guarantees of the fourth amendment.' 7 ' As Justice Frankfurter pointed out in United States v. Rabinowitz, 1 75 "the safeguards
of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving
dence a "veritable national crisis in law enforcement caused by smuggling of illicit
narcotics." Id. (citation omitted).
167 See Narcotics "Our No. 1 Crime Problem," U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 6,
1984, at 51, 51-52. In an interview, former Attorney General William French Smith
stated: "It's true that drugs are still in abundance. In fact, together with organized
crime, they are our No. 1 crime problem." Id. at 51; see also More Bad News in War
Against Drugs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 16, 1984, at 11 (outlining the increasing abuse and the negative effects of drugs in our society).
168 See Getting Straight, supra note 1, at 62-69 (discussing the many social costs of
drug and alcohol abuse and the difficulties of rehabilitation).
169 See Losing the War Against Drugs, supra note 1, at 49. This article stated that
"[t]he antidrug drive that is just now getting into full swing began soon after President Reagan assumed office in 1981. Among steps taken: Using military hardware
against smugglers, giving the Federal Bureau of Investigation jurisdiction in drug
cases and pressuring exporting nations to curtail drug production." Id.
170 See id. (noting that "[d]espite an intensifying counterattack by federal agents,
military forces, local police and diplomats, the odds keep mounting in favor of drug
dealers").
171 See Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. at 3311.
172 See id. at 3308-09 (citations omitted).
173 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
174 See Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. at 3321 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
175 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
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not very nice people."'' 76 Therefore, in performing any fourth
amendment analysis, a court must remember that the search has
to have some reasonable, prior justification before it may be
deemed constitutionally permissible. 17 7 What is in fact reason78
able will depend on the circumstances of the particular search.
It is not surprising that in the wake of recent governmental
attempts to stem international smuggling, drug smugglers have
developed new and ingenious methods to escape detection by
alert customs inspectors. 1 79 Many new types of drug smuggling,
foremost among them being alimentary canal smuggling, do not
present customs officials with the traditional indicia of smuggling, such as baggy clothing and false-bottomed suitcases.' 80 In
addition, alimentary canal smuggling is uniquely immune from
detection through a strip search, whereas the more conventional
practices of rectal and vaginal smuggling are easily uncovered by
this law enforcement procedure. 18 1 Furthermore, the clues that
rectal and vaginal smuggling afford customs inspectors-"an unnaturally stiff and erect gait, restricted body movement, and possession of lubricants"-are absent from the alimentary canal
smuggling situation. 8 2 Understandably, the detection of alimentary canal smuggling has become an increasingly confounding
problem for law enforcement officers and Government

officials.

183

The fact remains, however, that alimentary canal smugglers
continue to bring their forbidden cargo into the United States at
an increasing rate. 184 The reality that these smugglers are so difficult to detect has left the Government two practical alternatives:
either to ease the criteria upon which officials may search a suspected smuggler or to allow the smuggler to proceed into the
country unmolested.' 8 5 Although the indicia of alimentary canal
Id. at 69 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
See Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. at 3311 (citations omitted).
Id. at 3308 (citation omitted).
179 See id. at 3309. Justice Rehnquist stated that the "desperate practice [of alimentary canal smuggling] appears to be a relatively recent addition to the smugglers' repertoire of deceptive practices." Id.
180 See United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1349-50 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 597 (1984).
181 See United States v. Mendez-Jimenez, 709 F.2d 1300, 1303 (9th Cir. 1983).
182 See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 731 F.2d 1369, 1374 (9th Cir.
1984) (Jameson, J., dissenting), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3304 (1985).
183 See Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. at 3312.
184 See Losing the War Against Drugs, supra note 1, at 49.
185 See Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. at 3312 (discussing the alternatives available to customs inspectors trying to uncover alimentary canal smugglers).
176
177
178

1986]

NOTES

783

smuggling may seem innocent to the untrained eye, it is altogether reasonable that these factors might justify a search if perceived by a trained customs inspector.' 8 6 In fact, in United States v.
Cor162, 8 7 the Supreme Court explicitly recognized that a trained

law enforcement official will often perceive criminal behavior in
situations where a civilian would not. 8 8 Furthermore, the Cortez
Court held that the standard for review where a trained expert is
involved is whether under the "totality of the circumstances" an
experienced law enforcement officer would reasonably believe
that a search of the suspect is warranted.'8 9
In Hernandez, the Supreme Court properly chose "reasonable
suspicion" as the standard under which trained customs officials0
may search someone suspected of alimentary canal smuggling.19
While the Court has tipped the fourth amendment balance
slightly in favor of law enforcement officials, it has not, however,
approved unbridled searches by border officials absent some
prior justification. 1 9 ' The Court has merely clarified the priorjustification needed to search someone suspected of alimentary canal smuggling. 92 Common sense dictates that judicial review of
the reasonableness of a border search must be governed by the
practical knowledge of the extreme steps smugglers will take to
accomplish their illicit goals. The growing phenomenon of alimentary canal smuggling and the difficulties related to its detection have necessitated this modification of basic fourth
amendment principles. The only surprising thing about the Hernandez majority's decision is that it ignored Justice Stevens's advice to require nonpregnant persons suspected of alimentary
canal smuggling to submit to an X-ray examination.' This procedure would provide an expedient and somewhat dignified
method for detecting smuggling in progress. Nevertheless, the
debate on this issue will probably persist until the actual health
186 See United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1350 (11th Cir.) (citing
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 419 (1981)), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 597

(1984).
449 U.S. 411 (1981).
Id. at 419.
See id. at 417-18.
See Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. at 3311.
191 See id.
192 See id. at 3310-11 (rejecting other proposed constitutional standards in favor
187
188
189
190

of "reasonable suspicion" standard).
193 See id. at 3313 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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effects of X-ray exposure are known. 194
It is beyond debate that drug abuse is a serious problem in
modern-day America. Although many solutions to the problem
have been proposed, the key to eliminating drug abuse ultimately
lies with the detection and incarceration of those responsible for
smuggling drugs into this country. Clearly, the self-degrading
practice of alimentary canal smuggling proves that these smugglers will stop at nothing to forward their illegal activities. The
Government thus has been forced to take extreme measures to
combat them. Recognizing this, the Hernandez Court properly
deemed the search of Rosa Montoya de Hernandez reasonable
under the fourth amendment. 9 5 By doing so, the Court effectively refused to permit alimentary canal smugglers to escape
Government scrutiny simply because they exhibit fewer outward
signs of smuggling than traditional drug runners. 1 9 6 The Hernandez Court thereby struck the only logical, workable balance
between the Government's interest in detecting alimentary canal
smugglers and the privacy interests of individuals at our Nation's
border.
Peter P. Feeley
194 See id. at 3321-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing potentially harmful effects of X rays).
195 See id. at 3313.
196 See id. at 3311.

